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Political culture of post-soviet 
economic change: 
the case of financial-industrial groups
J E F F R E Y  K.  H A S S
∏
Beneath the seeming chaos and conflict of Russia’s post-socialist ex-
perience were structured dynamics of contentious reconstruction of 
fields (collective relations of power and culture institutionalized as 
authority and definitions of “normal”). This essay argues that the 
Russian experience was driven in no small part by contention over 
remaking core meanings and authority of field relations, practices, 
and boundaries. Contention over field reconstruction emerged as 
three groups’ interests and taken-for granted meanings of normal-
ity collided: those of Soviet-era managers, a new class of financial 
entrepreneurs and elites, and state elites and officials. Post-social-
ism has been a story of competing elite culture as well as interests.
JEFFREY K .  HASS (jeffhass89@post.harvard.edu, jhass@rich-
mond.edu), Department of Sociology & Anthropology, 28 West-
hampton Way, University of Richmond, VA 23173.
FINDING THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CHANGE:  
CULTURE AND FIELDS
Since 1989 East Europe and the former USSR have witnessed his-
toric post-socialist market-building. Alas, twenty years on we still 
inadequately understand dynamics of these economic revolutions 
(especially power and culture). Many studies have focused more on 
correlation in outcomes rather than causation (e. g. Eyal et al. 2001; 
Iankova 2002; Gerber and Hout 1998). Alternatively, social dynam-
ics of post-socialist economic change are assumed: analyses focus 
on institutions and elite coalitions, while presuming that individual 
rational action is the engine of strategic and practice (e. g. among 
others: Åslund 1995; Frydman, Rapaczynski, and Earle 1993; Fry-
dman and Rapaczynski 1994; Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapac-
zynski 2000; Gaddy and Ickes 2002). Understand the institutions 
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(laws, organizational procedures, etc.) and political alliances, and, 
following the principles of rational choice (utility maximization or 
optimization), you understand (supposedly) why things happen. 
Yet such analyses, so plentiful in economics and political science, 
do not always rise to the challenge of making sense of such com-
plex and grand events as Russia’s post-socialist, post-Soviet expe-
rience. This is unfortunate, given that market-building in transi-
tional economies provides a glimpse into the dynamics of the birth 
of capitalism, e. g. alteration of social practices, the rise of classes, 
and the imposition of new economic logics in the face of tradition. 
In particular, there has been little direct attention to dynamics of 
power and culture and their coalescence into emergent properties 
(but see Kennedy 2002). The meaning of categories, which struc-
ture social action (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1967), are the meat of 
post-socialist transitions; only a critical sociology aware of this can 
begin to approach cultural and power dynamics of market-building.
Yet a growing number of non-economists, and a minority of 
economists, accept that economies are stranger than mainstream 
theory suggests. Neoliberal theory assumes efficiency and a nat-
ural evolutionary selection process where the fit survive and the 
unfit fail. This may be true in some contexts but is far from sat-
isfactory as a general model, especially for post-socialist transi-
tions — no surprise, as efficiency theory does not explain the rise of 
the corporation in its birthplace, the United States (Roy 1997). Ef-
ficiency theory assumes the rule of law and state capacity to sup-
port property rights and market rules. Costs and calculation are 
assumed to be objective. Actors assess existing costs, benefits, op-
portunities, and dangers, and they then address existing rules as 
they see fit. Mechanisms of change and reproduction remain sur-
face manifestations of deeper, multidimensional change process-
es that remain in a black box. Even explanations that introduce 
institutions (e. g. laws or formal rules) eventually run into prob-
lems. High taxes, legal barriers, weak infrastructure, a state “cap-
tured” by social classes to support rent-seeking, or weak contract 
law are invoked to explain problems of economic growth or re-
structuring (cf. Schüsselbauer 1999; Hellman and Schankerman 
2000; Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman 1999, 2000). Weak institu-
tions, or weak state enforcement of capitalist laws, is a main cul-
prit here. Yet this instrumental approach to institutions — where 
institutions (rules and procedures) affect action by shaping costs 
and benefits — is too simple (Woodruff 2000). Institutions are in-
voked — but what are these, and how do they operate? Institutions 
as formalized rules — whether legal codes or organizational sche-
mas — emerge from strategies for dealing with existing costs and 
benefits in an environment, and shifts in those institutions consti-
tute economic change. For example, in economic literature, eco-
nomic change is the outcome of managerial attempts to minimize 
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transactions costs and improve effective and efficient coordination 
(Williamson 1985; Chandler 1977). Political scientists usually add a 
dimension of elite struggle for political power and profit; strategies 
for institutional design are a result not only of the goal of improv-
ing efficiency and profit, but also for expanding influence (Barnes 
2006; Wegren 2005; see also North 1990). Institutional change ends 
up reduced to agents’ interest-centered actions without explana-
tion of where interests come from (Friedland and Alford 1991). If 
this means maneuvering to change those rules — e. g. lobbying Bo-
ris Yeltsin’s Kremlin during privatization (Barnes 2006) — then 
economic change results. Problems of property rights are reduced 
to bad policies or rent-seeking, rather than analyzed as clashes and 
claims of different normalities. Neoclassical theory cannot concep-
tualize power and culture, and economists cannot examine how 
change has a multidimensional nature.
While an instrumental approach gives us part of the story, it 
remains unsatisfactory as the basis for a full account of econo-
mic change, especially of the radical variant that has been Rus-
sian post-socialism. In particular, an instrumental approach miss-
es two important facets of economic practice: the source of actors’ 
own preferences and “tool kits” of perceptions and strategic re-
sponses (which fit under the broad heading of “knowledge”); and 
emergent properties of institutional systems and actors. Thus, so-
ciological studies of economies and organizations have challenged 
assumptions about instrumental rationality that dominate main-
stream economics and political science (cf. Hass 2007). In particu-
lar, the development and refinement of field theory has been impor-
tant in bringing together power, culture, and institutions. Based 
primarily on work of the late Pierre Bourdieu (1990, 1993, 1998), 
field theory has produced important insights into the historical 
structuring of economic organization and behavior (cf. DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983, 1991; Fligstein 1990, 2001). However, field theory 
still requires greater refinement (Martin 2012; Fligstein and McAd-
am 2012; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008), and it has been rarely ap-
plied to post-socialism. One goal of this essay is to apply rudimen-
tary insights of field theory to Russian post-socialism — using the 
theory to make better sense of the empirical case, while also using 
the case to develop the theory. Field theory can help us see deeper 
social dimensions to the conflict and confusion at the heart of pri-
vatization and property since 1991. And in turn, Russia’s experi-
ence can help us develop that area where field theory is currently 
weak: change and conflict in field boundaries, structures, and rules1.
According to Pierre Bourdieu, social stratification is a function 
of fields, habitus, and capital. Habitus is, crudely put, an individu-
 1. This essay follows my earlier work (Hass 2011a: chapter 5; also 1997, 1999).
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al’s structured knowledge and the logic of how to use that knowl-
edge. While habitus does not control — people are not automatons — 
one’s knowledge does constrain and enable how one interprets and 
responds to the world. Capital is existing resources actors can de-
ploy. There are various forms of capital: economics (e. g. money 
and property), social (quality and structure of networks), and cul-
tural (cultural knowledge) capital are most often cited, although 
other forms are conceivable. Habitus and capital are related as 
strategy to resource: through experience and socialization actors 
learn particular techniques for deploying what capital they have, 
and existing capital can restrict or expand available strategies.
Fields are arrangements of actors — the dual metaphor is a mag-
netic field orienting actors in a particular way (e. g. categories and 
strategies of action), and a field of battle with actors arrayed in 
alliances and confrontations (Bourdieu 1990, 1998; Emirbayer and 
Johnson 2008). Behavior in the field is governed by doxa, taken-
for-granted rules of entry into and engagement within the field. 
Capital are actors’ resources: social (e. g. networks and reputa-
tion), economic (money or shares), cultural (tastes and behavio-
ral skills), and institutional (access to formal rules and organiza-
tions). Russia’s post-socialist doxa unraveled with radical reforms 
and emergence of new agents developing new claims and acting on 
new interests. Owners and oligarchs, holders of shares and money, 
wanted economic capital to be triumphant. Managers preferred so-
cial capital and their variant of cultural capital (technical knowl-
edge). State officials preferred institutional capital (the state) dom-
inate over other forms. And naturally, all had different forms and 
degrees of social capital, playing off networks with local elites, dif-
ferent Kremlin insiders and “clan” representatives, and alliances 
with parties and other groups in an attempt to advance their claims 
and conceptions of the normal doxa.
Fields are the context for strategic and collective action, and 
their reconstruction should be a matter of contention. Even more 
contentious is contention within and over the “master field” or 
“field of power” — the specific field that, through a constellation of 
material symbolic resources, has the greatest potential force to 
shape general principles of practice and structure for other (e. g. 
economic) fields. The battle over doxa, especially in the master 
field, was linked to the battle over property and principles of con-
trol — although temporally this battle began after battles of in-
ternal enterprise control had been underway (and in many cases 
were being resolved). This battle pitted managers, property own-
ers, and state officials against each other, and sometimes property 
owners versus other property owners (especially majority share-
holders versus and minority, and Russian and foreign sharehold-
ers). Because property filters throughout the economy as a funda-
mental rule of authority, the battle between elites over high-profile, 
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potentially lucrative firms (Norilsk Nikel, Iukos, aluminum firms) 
set the tone for overall meaning of and claims to property. These 
conspicuous cases became totems or signposts that other owners, 
managers, and state officials could use for negotiating power rela-
tions and structures. Attacks on oligarchs, for example, created a 
temporary panic that renationalization was imminent.
These three entities interact in Bourdieu’s framework. Field lo-
cation shapes an actor’s habitus and capital, the first from experi-
ence and the second from rules of resource access. Actors internal-
ize field rules, and resulting habitus influences how they judge and 
respond to contexts (opportunities, threats, etc.) — although habi-
tus does not overwhelm individual agency. This suggests that post-
socialist economic change has not been only competing elites and 
interests. Rather, it has been competing assumptions and knowl-
edge of how a “normal” economy operates, and conflict over ritual-
izing and normalizing these assumptions — and primacy of particu-
lar knowledge, habitus, and capital — in organized fields of property 
and governance.
COMPETING HABITUS AND FIELDS LOGICS :  
A  HISTORY OF POST-SOCIALIST ECONOMIC CULTURE
Economic organization is not merely the evolutionary emergence 
of efficient means for producing, trading, and making profit. Rath-
er, economic organization is the institutionalization of norms and 
logics of what constitutes a “normal” economy (Roy 1997). Actors 
compete and struggle to defend and enforce what they consider to 
be the ultimate meaning of economic action, which acts as a meas-
uring rod for the status and legitimacy of economic tactics and re-
lations. Victors in such struggle impose their versions of normali-
ty through formal laws, organizational structures and procedures, 
and arrangements and rights of property ownership. In this re-
gard, post-socialist economic change has been no different than the 
emergence of capitalism or state socialism. To better understand 
the post-socialist process, we must broaden our vision, beyond the 
usual political economy of state and business elites and their im-
mediate interests, to their logics of normal economic action — log-
ics inculcated in their own biographies and manifest in personal 
habitus of knowledge, strategies, and practices.
While there are multiple dimensions to logics of practice that 
are then institutionalized as field doxa, I will focus on three, all 
of which are related to conceptions of the normal economic order. 
The first is risk: assumptions of fundamentally abnormal behav-
ior that not only violates norms and assumptions of legitimate ac-
tion, but also threatens the existence of those very norms and, by 
extension, of economic entities. By positing what is risk — either 
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through claims or through deeds — actors are also constructing in 
an oblique fashion the normal economic order that is to be defend-
ed (cf. Boeva, Dolgopiatova, and Shironin 1992; Dolgopiatova and 
Evseeva 1994; Gurkov and Avraamova 1995). The second dimen-
sion is the source of authority: what position, status, or skills and 
knowledge are crucial to the normal operation of a normal econo-
my. A particular vision of a normal economy presupposes a hierar-
chy of necessary, functional positions and knowledge. Thus, those 
actors with these functional positions and knowledge are deserv-
ing of social and economic authority. The third dimension is rights 
and limits of property governance. Property governance involves 
normal, natural claims to resources. As such, assumptions about 
fundamental rights regarding the use of property, as well as limits, 
underpin models of how power or authority should be distributed 
in a normal economy. Note that this does not rule out opportunis-
tic behavior, such as claiming property rights in order to rent-seek 
or guard one’s privilege. Property and governance rights are, like 
any rights, claims for legitimacy. Unless it is a purely naked grab 
for resources — such naked grabs are rare generally, even in post-
Soviet Russia — opportunism ultimately is cloaked in these claims 
of normality, which in turn constrain the behavior of those who 
make these assertions by making them accountable to their claims2.
I now turn to the key actors in the drama over reorganizing post-
Soviet fields — Red Directors, financial entrepreneurs (so-called 
“oligarchs”), and state elites — and their corresponding property 
empires, financial-industrial groups (finansovo-promyshlennye 
gruppy, FPG) — Defensive FPGs, Financial FPGs, and State-Cen-
tered FPGs3. A summation of their logics of economic normality is 
in Figure 1. The coexistence of these three types of property and 
organizational principles was problematic because all three sets of 
elites were fighting not only of money (investment, state money, 
etc.), but also over legitimacy. Defensive FPGs were the first prop-
erty empires to emerge, and Red Directors began to exercise in-
fluence over the field of power in the early 1990s, for example hin-
dering tight budget policies and using privatization to gain further 
control over their enterprises. However, as the Yeltsin regime con-
solidated its own power through the 1990s and made an informal 
 2. I not suggesting that opportunism (theft, rent-seeking, etc,) is absent or 
marginal. However, I suggest that theft and opportunism are not agnos-
tic to culture: Red Directors, oligarchs, and state elites as a rule do not 
steal in any old way, just as they do not organize economic practice in any 
old way. Habitus, and fields also shape knowledge and strategies availa-
ble for opportunistic behavior.
 3. Data and analysis for this discussion come from Hass 2011a, 2011b. See 
also Johnson 1997; Prokop 1995; Starodubrovskaia 1995; Batchikov and 
Petrov 1995; Gortbatova 1995; Kulikov, Latysheva, and Nikolaev 1994.
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alliance with the oligarchs, the balance tipped from Red Directors 
and Defensive FPGs to financial elites and Financial FPGs. Finan-
cial capitalism seemed dominate over the field of power and Rus-
sia’s economy. However, the 1998 ruble crisis shattered their seem-
ingly inevitable domination and ushered in the return of the state, 
eventually consolidated under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.
Socialized and on the job in Soviet industrial enterprises in the 
Soviet era, Red Directors as a rule were knowledgeable primari-
ly about the process of production. Supply of necessary inputs, co-
ordination of labor and provision for the labor force, and ensuring 
output were key to Red Directors’ survival and success in the So-
viet era. Those individuals who best played the game of using net-
works and maneuvering the Plan were most likely to rise to the 
ranks of general directors. Long experience in the politics of pro-
duction and the Plan shaped their habitus and logics and knowl-
edge of practice. For Red Directors, the core risk to normal or-
ganization was the disruption of supply and labor — resources that 
were key to production and to political legitimacy, especially be-
cause “success” in the Soviet era meant fulfilling or overfulfill-
ing output norms and providing for the enterprise’s workers. The 
source of authority for Red Directors was their organizational 
knowledge and position. Atop the enterprise structure, they could 
see the entire production process and apply knowledge they had 
gained through experience to guarantee proper running of the en-
terprise, so that it could fulfill its productive function. While Red 
Directors came to accept that property rights allowed claims to re-
siduals (i. e. profit), it did not allow total interference within the 
enterprise if such interference would hinder production and em-
ployee provision. Red Directors often articulated a “moral econo-
my” of the enterprise as a sacred collective that could not be hurt 
FIGURE 1. Actors and logics (derived from Hass 2011 a: 167)
Defensive FPGs 
(manager-centered) 
Financial FPGs 
(owner-centered) 
State-centered 
FPGs
Core risk Collapse of supply, 
and thus of 
production
Loss of investment 
and financial control
Loss of state 
power over 
economy
Source of 
authority
Organizational 
knowledge of pro-
duction and labor
Property ownership, 
financial knowledge
National security
Property 
governance
Limited to claim on 
residuals
Disposal of assets and 
ultimate decision-
making authority
Formal: use of 
assets; Real: 
state interests
The Firstborn: Red Directors and Defensive FPGs.
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by the mere pursuit of profit, because such naked pursuit was lit-
tle different from rent-seeking and theft (Hass 2011 b).
Natural variation aside, the general logic of the generic Red Di-
rector habitus — generated by long-time experience in the Soviet 
era and thus reflected Soviet logics of everyday economic life — was 
institutionalized in interorganizational relations, and later through 
property ties, in the Defensive FPG. The fundamental logic to this 
structure was interlocking property relations that defended firms 
against outside control or accountability, and against uncertain-
ty of supply and finance by solidifying supply relations and liter-
ally by pooling and distributing funds for support, as in a mutual 
aid society. Exchange partners needed to group together to sup-
port exchange and supply of goods linked in production cycles, and 
so this FPG emerged as a safety net embodying production log-
ics and relations. Thus, Defensive FPGs often began as voluntary 
associations in the late 1980s of enterprises that had produced for 
each other or made similar products and were often enough in 
the same ministry or glavk. Older directors used to state-centered 
planning saw risk in collapsing exchange and distribution, financ-
es, and unsettled rules of the new economic order. After one in-
terview I conducted in 1995, a manager of a chemical FPG in St. 
Petersburg mentioned heatedly criticized bankers and Financial 
FPGs as bloodsuckers who drained Russia’s wealth and cared lit-
tle about production, educating a new generation of chemists and 
engineers, and maintaining Russia’s competitive edge in chemical 
production and research. The head of a local Petersburg furniture 
FPG intimated the same. When I asked about pursuing outside in-
vestment, perhaps by entering a Financial FPG — dominant in 1997, 
when the interview took place — he responded quickly and forceful-
ly that he did not trust “bankers,” who, he claimed, bought enter-
prises only to squeeze them dry and discard them.
To build a Defensive FPG, participating firms created a central 
holding company — sometimes some kind of financial institution — 
to which they turned over shares. (Defensive FPGs usually had an 
associated bank as well, for attracting private investment or fun-
neling state subsidies or other funds.) Holding company shares 
were then split among FPG members, whose directors sat on the 
FPG board of directors. In this way the FPG would defend mana-
gerial autonomy and enterprise security. Comments by the direc-
tor of a Petersburg bread factory are instructive. Former Party 
and state-ministerial elites actively aided creating some Defensive 
FPGs, using networks and the ministerial template (Prokop 1995; 
Gorbatova 1995, Starodubrovskaia 1995). Defensive FPG Fin Prom 
was created by a coalition of local state officials, enterprise man-
agers, and the State Privatization Committee; mining companies, 
real estate firms, a bank, trading company. FPG Konsensus was 
formed from the Soviet Ministry of Light Industry. Petersburg’s 
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Energomashstroitel’naia Korporatsiia (EMK), originally MGO En-
ergomash, was founded on a former state structure and sector. The 
raison d’être was to reorganize inter-enterprise relations in the 
economic crisis and privatization.
The institutionalization of Red Directors’ status and habitus in 
Defensive FPGs was the first manifestation of post-socialist eco-
nomic culture, because Red Directors were best situated and had 
the best capital early on to benefit from the collapse of Soviet so-
cialism. They did not have to “emerge” as financial elites and ol-
igarchs did, nor were they initially attacked and delgitimated as 
were state officials and state-held property. However, the man-
ager-centered and production-centered logic of the Red Director 
habitus and the Defensive FPG faced several potential problems. 
First, they did not fit so well with the emerging “transition culture” 
(Kennedy 2002) that favored finance over production and that pos-
ited “Soviet” and “socialist” (which Red Directors were) as ille-
gitimate and abnormal. Second, while some Defensive FPGs could 
earn profits from sales of some products (e. g. exports of electric-
ity generating equipment) or temporarily attracting capital to the 
FPG’s financial institution, Defensive FPGs did not always follow 
sufficiently fundamental restructuring or generate sufficient capital 
to develop in the post-socialist world, leaving them at an eventual 
disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors. Third, once Defensive FPGs 
had been created, it was possible for a director of the central finan-
cial organization to turn the tables on its founders and gain con-
trol over the members of that particular Defensive FPGs. Exactly 
this happened in the late 1990s to Energomash (EMK)4. Aleksandr 
Stepanov attempted to use various financial machinations to gain 
personal control over the members of EMK. While this violated a 
core principle of the Defensive FPG — to guard the autonomy of 
the member companies — Stepanov was initially successful. How-
ever, the principle of autonomy eventually generated resistance, 
especially from Stepanov’s eventual target, Leningradskii Metal-
licheskii Zavod (LMZ). After a protracted battle in various courts, 
LMZ, Elektrosila, and allies defeated Stepanov and EMK, depriv-
ing EMK of core companies.
Finally, the status of Red Directors and Defensive FPGs would 
wane because, at the center of the field of power — the Kremlin 
(which had not yet devolved that much real institutional power) — 
the managerial clan had lost the battle of the clans in the mid-
1990s. Instead, a new clan representing an emerging financial elite 
had gained influence within the Kremlin and Yeltsin’s inner cir-
cle (Hoffman 2002). The state began to favor this new elite and its 
habitus and logics of fields and organization. The time had come 
 4. For an analysis of internal conflict at EMK, see Hass (2011 a: chapter 5).
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for the oligarchs and a new organization and use of property, and 
a new set of principles for fields.
TEMPORARY CAPITALIST HEGEMONS:  
OLIGARCHS AND FINANCIAL  FPGS
The second set of actors was financial entrepreneurs, especially 
those who became the superrich “oligarchs.” Financial entrepre-
neurs often came from the ranks of the Komsomol, research insti-
tutes, or similar bodies, in which knowledge of production was less 
important than other knowledge, in particular manipulating access 
to financial and similar resources (dues, funds for research projects, 
etc.). Outside the managerial hierarchy in the late Soviet era, some 
Komsomol leaders and institute employees saw opportunity for 
speculative profits during Gorbachev’s reforms — where their man-
agerial bosses saw the repetition of an earlier pattern of talk about 
reform ultimately failing to reach fruition (Hoffman 2002). Wheth-
er using access to hard currency to initiate import and resale trade 
for profit, or setting up early financial institutions, these younger 
financial wizards learned how to work in the shadows and on the 
margins of the slowly liberalizing and unraveling late Soviet eco-
nomy. Their experience was in organizing resources; organizations 
were less about production than about procedures and capital. As 
these younger entrepreneurs turned to speculative trading in the 
late 1980s, they conceived a core risk as losing control over capital 
and the return of investment. Their conception of authority was 
grounded in knowledge and control of resources, especially money. 
Finally, property was the rights not only to profits and principal 
of investment, but also decision-making authority stemming from 
the provision of capital. In short, financial entrepreneurs were the 
closest thing to nascent capitalists in post-Soviet Russia. To man-
agers of banks and Financial FPGs, enterprises were commodities 
to be bought and sold (via shares) through market means. Not the 
enterprise itself, but capital and shareholding were sacred.
Financial entrepreneurs’ (Khodorkovskii, Berezovskii et al.) 
experience of making money in the Komsomol or trading defi-
cit goods extended into Financial FPGs. After 1992 major com-
mercial banks expanded beyond financial games with currency 
and treasury bills (GKOs, OFZs) to acquiring shares in privatized 
firms. Oneksimbank and finance company Mikrodin united as In-
terros and acquired shares by various means in such privatized 
enterprises as Norilsk Nickel or Moscow car factory ZiL (later 
saved by Mayor Iurii Luzhkov). Menatep, Al’fa-bank, and Inkom-
bank invested in oil, confectioneries, and metals. Komsomol ex-
perience gave these elites skills to manipulate finances and rules 
and use loose laws for gain; they could also apply market vocab-
203
Глобальный 
капитализм: 
актантно-
нарративный  
анализ 
идеологии
Санкт-Петербург 
2013
ulary to engage Western investors. They had sufficient capital 
to interest the cash-strapped state, and they had as allies some 
Kremlin insiders who came less from nomenklatura than from the 
Komsomol or other institutes. These entrepreneurs and organi-
zations built empires by obtaining shares through privatization 
auctions and the secondary market through a variety of means, 
usually indirect and difficult to trace formally. Because they con-
ceived of risk primarily in terms of control of and return on in-
vestment, i. e. property ownership and governance, their prop-
erty empires differed in two ways from Defensive FPGs. First, 
this elite made sure to have a presence on boards of directors and 
managers in their newly-acquired properties. As Menatep pres-
ident A. Zurabov noted, “in Russia it is still impossible to make 
financial investments without real control over the debtor… If 
we control management, the situation, capital streams, account 
transactions, and the like, then of course the probability of a re-
turn of such loans in order are higher than loans by a clientele 
on the side…” (Pappe et al 1997:52). Second, unlike Defensive 
FPGs — where risk was equated with losing control of exchange 
and supply or losing subsidies — Financial FPGs were organized 
around the principle of diversification — spreading risk around. As 
one manager at FPG Sokol noted, “we operate on the principle of 
the submarine, where there are several compartments — this helps 
keep it afloat during difficult times when one compartment is suf-
fering” (Ekonomika i zhizn’ #33 1994: 37). Menatep invested in 
firms organized around exports to gain control of those hard-cur-
rency accounts — but this also left Menatep with diverse holdings 
(even if oil was an important part of the Menatep empire). Bank 
Rossiiskii Kredit began buying shares to engage in speculation, 
but ultimately the bank found it had a diversified empire.
Financial elites and their FPGs were temporary hegemons af-
ter the 1995 loans-for-shares (zalogovaia privatizatsiia) auctions, 
which were rigged in their favor. Upon gaining controlling packets 
of shares, the financial elite moved to consolidate governance. This 
was not so easy at the start. The test case for oligarch power was 
the battle for control over Norilsk Nickel, which pitted new owners 
Oneximbank against entrenched managers. After a long struggle 
through various courts, Oneximbank emerged victorious. Khodor-
kovskii also faced resistance from managers within his newly ac-
quired Iukos oil empire. Only by using various machinations with 
share offerings did Khdorkovskii consolidate his control over that 
empire. As the 1990s wore on, it became clear that the financial 
elites had Yeltsin on their side, and that they could play the new 
formal laws of Yeltsin’s regime and the broader logics of emerging 
Russian capitalism. Thus, after 1995 the Financial FPG and finan-
cial elite eclipsed the Defensive FPG and Red Directors for hegem-
ony over Russia’s economy. However, the story was not yet over. 
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In 1998 the oligarchs and Yeltsin’s Kremlin were seriously wound-
ed by the ruble crisis. Not only did many oligarchs and Financial 
FPGs lose capital in the crisis; they also lost the halo of inevitable 
ascendance. Suddenly they seemed not only the prime villains be-
hind inequality and crisis in Russia; they also seemed vulnerable. 
The crisis hurt Yeltsin’s image and emboldened his political oppo-
nents. Eventually, Yeltsin turned over the reigns of power to a pre-
viously badly-known state operative everyone presumed would fol-
low the whims of the oligarchs. It turned out Vladimir Putin had 
other plans, and he had tools to realize them in the face of oligarch 
opposition. The stage was set for, yet again, a transfer of hegem-
ony to another elite and another set of principles for the organiza-
tion of property and fields.
THE WINNERS THUS FAR:  
STATE ELITES AND STATE-CENTERED  FPGS
A third “class” and logic of economic organization was ever-pre-
sent but in the 1990s latent: state elites and officials — especially the 
siloviki, elite from the security apparatus — and a dirigiste logic of 
organization. In the 1990s on its contours were somewhat blurry. 
State elites were often outmaneuvered or co-opted by Red Direc-
tors and later by financiers. The latent logic of state-centered elites 
and organization centered on state authority and security; pro-
duction and profit were secondary to the prerogative of the state 
and the security and prestige of the nation for which state officials 
spoke. Correspondingly, the main risk was loss of state influence 
(but not necessarily ownership) over economic activity. The con-
verse was that authority was linked to state and national securi-
ty: Russia was not unique in that the raison d’etre of the state was 
security and control, but this logic was stronger in Russia than in 
most other European states. Finally, the logic of property and gov-
ernance was shifting in the post-Soviet period. Total state owner-
ship and control of the economy had proven disastrous; however, 
state control of or influence over sectors crucial to national secu-
rity was not so odious. Majority share ownership was no worse 
than total ownership, and in fact brought a benefit: minority share-
holders could be persuaded to invest in modernization in return to 
a portion of future profits (although without much say in the run-
ning of these companies).
Privatization and liberalization meant the state was withdraw-
ing from the economy. Only a few giants stood in the arena: rail-
ways monopoly Rossiiskaia Zheleznaia Doroga (RZhD), electrici-
ty monopoly Edinaia Elektrichestkaia Sistema (EES), and natural 
gas monopoly Gazprom. Gazprom had survived the fate of the oil 
sector, where the state monopoly was broken up and its pieces pri-
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vatized5. This structure, along with its control over potentially lu-
crative national gas, made this a potentially important vehicle for 
the exercise of state power. In particular, Gazprom and Gazpropm-
bank were a key part of Putin’s strategy of subordinating the ol-
igarchs to the state — once Putin had ousted Rem Viakhirev from 
Gazprom and installed Aleksei Miller as director. Putin’s attack 
on his competitors was two-pronged. First, he used Gazprom’s 
wealth and some debts Gazprom or Gazpropmbank held over some 
oligarchs’ holdings to gain control over the media — in particular, 
Gusinskii’s media empire. The second prong was to use kompro-
mat against recalcitrant oligarchs — to put them in jail (Khodorko-
vskii), to force them to turn over their property and flee the coun-
try (Gusinskii, Berezovskii), or to keep quiet and toe the Kremlin’s 
line (other oligarchs)6. By 2004, state-owned giants Gazprom and 
Rosneft were the main instruments of state power — initially used 
to take over oligarch property, and then to redistribute hydrocar-
bon wealth to increase dependency on the state.
Eventually, this model of post-socialist dirigisme spread in 
the creation of new goskorporatsii. OAK and OSK are two famil-
iar state corporations, but one of the more interesting has been 
Rossiiskaia Tekhnologiia. Rostekhnologiia, headed by Putin con-
tact Sergei Chemezov, was an attempt to reunite heavy industry 
and “strategically important” companies and sectors under state 
control once again. One purpose for creating Rostekhnologiia was 
to guard underdeveloped, unreconstructured, and vulnerable Rus-
sian industries from market competition, especially foreign com-
petition (Hass 2011 b). While these state-centered FPGs have, like 
Defensive FPGs, helped defend production, they have not focused 
primarily on defending supply or managerial authority: manages 
are subordinate to the state, and production is framed in terms of 
state or national importance rather than as important for its own 
sake (the Soviet logic of Defensive FPGs). And while state-cen-
tered FPGs have not focused primarily on a “bottom line” of prof-
it as was the case for Financial FPGs, profit and share ownership 
are not unimportant. Member companies in state-centered FPGs 
are state-owned precisely because the state owns a majority of 
shares — which the state could sell if need be. One tactic has been 
to sell minority groups of shares to foreign investors, to raise cap-
ital in return for longer-term access to a percentage of profits (but 
not of ultimate decision-making authority). Thus, while the new 
 5. Technically, Gazprom was reorganized into many daughter firms, but in 
reality these remained under centralized control by Rem Viakhirev.
 6. For sake of space, I will not go into detail over the politics and strategies 
Putin and siloviki pursued to subdue the oligarchs and augment state pow-
er. These general events are well-known to the readership of this volume, 
and I recount these details elsewhere (Hass 2011 a, 2011 b).
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state-centered FPG and its field logic is not en embrace of capi-
talism, neither is it a return to the Soviet logic of economic cul-
ture and fields.
CONCLUSION:  
ECONOMIC CULTURE,  HABITUS AND FIELDS,  AND 
POST-SOCIALISM
In this essay I have tried to show that one cannot understand the 
broader picture and deeper processes of post-socialism change only 
by focusing on efficiency, markets, or state and elite interests — as 
economists and political scientists usually do. Rather, economic 
culture plays an important role in post-Soviet economic change. 
However, that economic culture does not exist in some disembod-
ied, free-floating, vague and amorphous form. Rather, economic 
culture is related to authority, and it operates through individu-
al actors who reproduce economic structures through their prac-
tices (as driven by habitus), and through the institutionalization 
of habitus and culture through the organization of property and 
formulation of risk and authority in FPGs and fields. Marx, We-
ber, and Durkheim all saw culture operating (although in differ-
ent ways) through collective expressions and social processes and 
forms. Where we see collective practices, institutions, and organ-
izations, we are seeing culture. And in recent years, the story of 
post-Soviet property has been not only a story of elite interests, in-
trigues, and power — it has also been the drama of competing forms 
and content of economic culture and the battle over which mean-
ings would dominate the post-socialist landscape. And one thing is 
certain: this drama is not yet over. Red Directors seemed in charge 
initially once they emasculated shock therapy; oligarchs seemed in 
charge after privatization. To assume siloviki and their dirigisme 
are eternal would be foolish as well. For is history teaches us one 
thing, it is that culture is ever-changing — even in economies.
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